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Abstract
As required by the WTO accession, China is opening its logistics industry to international
logistics companies. What are these companies' strategies in the China market, and how
are Chinese domestic logistics companies responding? The author interviewed four
executives in charge of China business from three major international logistics companies
and one international logistics user, and surveyed the literature to track the investments
and plans of international and Chinese logistics companies. The thesis analyzes the
strategies of third-party logistics (3PL) providers in the China logistic industry, namely
international companies, and Chinese state-owned and Chinese private companies. The
research finds that network expansion is the main strategy for the international companies,
and the tendency is to operate independently. Infrastructure and extensive network are the
state-owned companies' main assets, and niche market expertise is the private
companies' strategy to survive and compete in the China logistics industry. These three
types of players will coexist in the short term in China, while in the long term, when the
international logistics companies have set up their infrastructure and network, there will
probably a new round of shuffling.
Thesis Supervisor: Dr. Lawrence Lapide
Title: Research Director, MIT Center for Transportation and Logistics
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Executive Summary
In December 2001, China officially gained accession to the World Trade Organization
(WTO). As required by the WTO, China is opening its logistics industry to the
international logistics players. What are the international logistics companies' strategies
in the China market? How are Chinese domestic logistics companies responding? The
thesis takes a market research, pragmatic and qualitative approach to address these
questions.
The industry and the strategies are too broad for a thesis to fully cover. The thesis
analyzes the strategies of different three types of logistics players in the China logistic
industry, namely the international logistics companies, China's state-owned companies
and privately-owned companies. The thesis mainly researched one category of 3PL
providers, those with parcel, courier and aviation services like UPS, FedEx and Deutsche
Post World Net. This angle narrowed the research scope, yet still reflects the dynamics of
the industry. For the Chinese companies, the thesis discusses two main types of players:
the state-owned logistics companies and the privately-owned logistics companies.
The China logistics industry is growing fast. This is a function of the overall economic
development of China and China's integration with the world economy. Because of the
high demand for logistics services, many researchers have discussed the logistics
infrastructure in China, and the logistics operations and strategies from the users'
perspective (namely, the perspective of multinational corporations in China), but research
on the foreign investment strategies in the industry and the local companies' response is
limited.
China's logistics industry experienced three stages: when the industry was dominated by
the state-owned companies; when the local privately-owned companies emerged; and
when the international players entered the market and gained full rights to play under
China's WTO commitment. These stages align with China's market opening and policy
changes.
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International logistics companies first entered China in the early 1980's. Because of the
policy limits, they were able to form only joint ventures with Chinese companies. But as
the government loosened the limitations, these international logistics companies were
given more leeway, especially after China joined the WTO.
Because of previous limited operations in China, international logistics companies' reach
and the network limited their development. Infrastructure and customer expansion
therefore became a priority for these companies. Those who have the extensive
infrastructure and customer base will have the largest market.
There are many means to growth. Direct investment, merger and acquisition, strategic
alliances and franchising are popular among the international logistics companies in
either building the infrastructure or the customer base. High-end, integrated logistics
services, and good education and training programs help ensure the international logistics
players gain bigger market shares. As China opened the industry to the international
logistics companies, independence became a theme - even though joint venture still has
attraction to some.
The Chinese state-owned companies are building themselves as asset-based logistics
providers. They have traditional advantages: they have the government support, and over
decades have built up an extensive infrastructure. They were the first movers in the
industry. This gives them an advantage over the international and local, privately-owned
companies. However, it's necessary for them to upgrade their old infrastructures and
capabilities to cater to the modern logistics requirements. The privately-owned
companies lack a nationwide network and infrastructure; they also lack the capital. So the
realistic strategies for them are to develop into niche market players, as capital needs will
always be a concern.
Both the state-owned and privately-owned Chinese companies hope to avoid direct
competition with the international logistics companies. Low-end, labor intensive,
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localized logistics services, such as a financing warehousing service, provide the
opportunities. Desire for cooperation with international logistics companies is strong -
this will help improve the Chinese logistics companies' service level, and give them the
access to global reach. Because Chinese logistics companies are not strong enough to
provide global, integrated logistics services, cooperation with international companies
and becoming part of the global supply chain is a practical and realistic compromise.
Since the market is huge and is growing fast, these three types of companies have their
own target market/customers. Their services, network, infrastructure and expertise are
different too. This helps create an environment in which they can co-exist in the near
term. However, after the international logistics companies build up their infrastructure
and network, direct competition will increase. How the landscape of the China logistics
industry will evolve is an interesting issue to explore in future research.
3
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Chapter 1. Introduction
This thesis studies the strategies of international logistics companies, especially Federal
Express, United Parcel Services, TNT Post Group (TPG) and Deutsche Post World Net
(Deutsche Post, or DPWN), as examples of how international logistics companies invest
in third party logistics (3PL) services in China, and how Chinese domestic logistics
providers respond to the direct competition in the China market.
This topic is of current interest because China was the fastest growing market in the past
decade, and will remain so in the following decades. The author hopes to assist readers in
better understanding the dynamics of the China logistics market.
1.1. Background
On December 11, 2001, China officially joined the World Trade Organization (WTO).
The entry into the WTO has a significant impact on 3PL market.
Before China's entry, international logistics providers could only play a limited role in
China. There were huge limits on their activities. For example: foreign players were not
allowed to invest in road transportation; in the freight forwarding sector, only foreign
minority was allowed, and therefore a joint venture became a must; and, the laws
regulated that the general manager or chairman of a joint venture must be a Chinese
citizen.
As part of joining the WTO, China must remove most of those restrictions on the
logistics industry, opening the market to the international logistics companies (ILCs),
creating more opportunities for these companies in China. In turn, facing the fiercer
direct competition from the ILCs, China's local logistics companies (CLC) need to
evolve and respond. How will international and domestic players interact with each other
and restructure China's logistic market in the near future?
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1.2. Research Questions & Approaches
This thesis is aimed to answer this question. The author hopes to outline the ecosystem
after China opens its logistics market: How will international and local logistics providers
invest, compete and respond to each other's strategy? What will the market structure look
like after China's accession to WTO? etc.
To address these issues, the author surveyed and interviewed leading international and
Chinese logistics providers where possible, to outline the industry dynamics when ILCs
are granted the full rights to play in the China market along with local companies. The
author took a market analysis method to approach the problems.
However, the research scope would have been too huge to manage without being
specifically defined, and it's almost impossible to exhaust the entire industry in such a
big market. The viable research method was to mainly observe the strategies of TPG,
Deutsche Post, UPS and FedEx as the major international logistics providers. They are all
well known courier and parcel service providers, but their 3PL services are expanding
quickly in China. These companies provide a comprehensive, if not holistic, view of how
ILCs are investing in China.
As for Chinese logistics companies (CLCs), the choice was more diverse. This is because
CLCs usually operate on small scales. Furthermore, unlike international companies that
usually release important information to the shareholders, stock markets or the media,
Chinese companies usually do not have such a mechanism to disclose information on
their business, operations and strategies.
Meanwhile, it's unrealistic to limit the research to a few companies and sectors such as
the parcel and courier service. In terms of size and business scope, no Chinese logistics
company is comparable to the international giants. The author will basically limit the
research to the 3PL providers, so as to have a good comparison.
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Although the research is generally limited to the target companies, these foreign
companies can reflect to a significant extent the strategies of different kinds of ILCs. The
research also projects the typical responses from Chinese companies, whether they are
privately-owned, or state-owned companies.
1.3. Conclusion
Before China's accession to the WTO, there were restrictions on how foreign logistics
companies could invest and operate in China. After that, China gradually removed the
restrictions, and provided more opportunities for foreign logistics investors/providers. By
the end of 2005, almost the whole China logistics market, except for domestic aviation
and railroad transportation, will be theoretically open to foreign investment. This thesis
intends to discuss how international logistics companies will invest in that large market,
and how local players will cope with the competition from the former. The thesis will
provide some insights into the dynamic, China logistics market.
7
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Chapter 2. Literature Review
This chapter examines China's macro economy and its logistics economics. The research
done on the topic of this thesis or those topics similar to this thesis are covered too.
2.1. China Economy Review
In the year of 2004, China recorded a GDP of V13.65 trillion, or $1649.6 billion at the
exchange rate $1=Y8.275. Compared with that of the previous year, the GDP increased by
9.5%. The foreign reserve increased by $206.7 billion to $609.9 billion.
The import and export summed $1,154.8 billion, increased by 35.7%, among which
export was $593.4 billion, and import $561.4 billion, with an international trade surplus
of $32 billion. Import and export increased by 35.4% and 36% respectively.
Foreign direct investments (FDIs) reached $60.6 billion. The following table illustrates
the rough distribution of the investments and the average investment per project.
Table 1 FDI in China, 2004
Contracted Finalized Average
Number of Investment Investment Investment
Industry/Sector Projects ($billion) ($billion) ($million)
Total 43664 153.48 60.63 1.4
Manufacturing 30386 109.74 43.02 1.4
Real Estate 1767 13.49 5.95 3.4
Leasing, Business Service 2661 6.74 2.82 1.1
Transportation,
Warehousing & Postal
Service 638 2.37 1.27 2.0
The others* 8212 21.14 7.57 0.9
*The others include, but not limited to, agriculture, forestry, stock raising, fishing,
mining, electricity, gas& water, construction, computer service & software, data
transmission, retail and wholesale, lodge & accommodation, entertainment, culture,
education & health, etc
Source: State Statistics Bureau of China, 2/28/2005
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By 2002, more than 400 of the Fortune Global 500 had invested in China, mainly in three
regions: the Pearl River Delta, the Yangtze River Delta and the Bohai Bay Triangle. The
following table briefly describes the demographic and economic development of these
three regions.
Table 2 Comparison of the three major metropolitan clusters
Items Bohai Bay Triangle Yangtze River Delta Pearl River Delta
Areas and Beijing, Tianjin, part of Shanghai, part of Jiangsu Guangdong
Cities Covered Hebei Province etc & Zhejiang Province Province
Area ('000 sq.km) 70 99.5 42
% regional area
vs national area 0.73% 1.04% 0.44%
Population
(million) 45 74.5 23
% regional
population
vs national
population 3.5% 5.8% 1.8%
GDP in V B ($B)* 826.1 (99.8) 1535.1 (185.5) 737.9(89.2)
% regional GDP
vs National GDP 9% 17% 8%
Finalized FDIs ($
B) 6.90 12.75 12.54
Net Export ($ B) 20.91 63.18 84.7
*Exchange Rate: $1 = RMB8.275
Sources : 1. State Statistics Bureau of China; 2. Wang, H.; Bai, Q. (2003). Comparative Research on the
Development of China's Three Metropolitan Clusters. Economy of Special Economic Zones. 2003, (6).
[Online]:http://www.szeconomy.com/docc/bdlt.html (3/6/2005)
The following figure shows the freight turnover and growth in the year of 2004 in China:
China Transport Volume & Growth, 2004
r 40
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Figure 1 China Transport Volume & Growth, 2004
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The economic dynamics correlates to the logistics activities. According to the China
Logistics Report 2004 by the UK-based Transport Intelligence Ltd, these three regions
are home to 75% of 3PL companies in China.
Figure 2 Three major logistics regions
The ports recorded a throughput of 4 billion metric tons with an increase of 21.3%, of
which 1.15 billion tons was for import and export. China ports handled 61.5 million
twenty-foot equivalent units (TEUs).
Research and Market claims in its report, China Logistics Industry 2004, that 'in the past
three years (2001-2003), 70% of the logistics service providers experienced a 30% annual
increase in business.' This corresponds to the estimates of Mr. Ding Junfa, the Executive
VP of the China Federation of Logistics and Procurement.
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Table 3 Trend of Logistics Development
Year GDP Total Logistics Increase of Total 3PL Estimated
Increase Costs Logistics Logistics Revenue 3PL Increase
in Y B ($B) Costs Costs vs GDP in B ($B)
2001 7.5% 2030 (245) 6.7% 21.1% 40(4.8) -
2002 8.3% 2200 (265) 8.4% 21.5% 60(7.3) 50%
2003 9.1% 2500 (302) 13.6% 21.4% 80(9.7) 33%
1-9/004 9.5% 1860 (225) 16.8% 21.6% 100 (12.1)* 25%
Source : Ding, J. (2004). Three Years after the WTO Accession and the China Logistics
Industry. [online]: http://www.chinawuliu.com.cn/bake/uploadFace/20041228.htm
(2/17/2005)
* Estimates. The number for 2004 is for the whole year.
The fast growing economy is pushing the logistics industry. The above numbers show
that the growth of logistics business is accelerating with a speed faster than the GDP
growth, and this growth is stronger particularly in the field of 3PL. Some claim that
logistics will become the next driver of China's economic growth, and in the next decade,
the logistics industry will grow at an average annual rate of 20%1. Because of the
generally low standard of logistics operations in China, there is much room for
investment and improvement.
2.2. Literature on the China Logistics Industry
2.2.1. Companies' Logistics Operation
Because of the extensive presence of multinational corporations (MNCs) in China, many
articles have been published on how the MNCs shall set their logistics strategies in China.
As trade and distribution are two totally different business areas in China, Bolton and
Wei clearly defined the difference 2. According to their explanation (citing the China's
WTO documents), trading rights are 'the rights to import and export goods. But still, only
some special companies (usually part of the China government) are authorized to deal
with the 'state-traded goods', which are usually strategic materials such as cotton,
processed oil, and rice. The paper also listed a few risks in the China market, such as the
'regulatory fragmentation', which denotes the situation that multiple government bodies
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have the rights to regulate and govern the logistics practice. One investor may have to
face numerous government agents in order to have a business registered or a problem
solved. Another example is local protectionism, which prevails in the entire China. The
lack of logistics talent is a big issue for 'long-term success.'
Jiang discussed 'how international firms are coping with supply chain issues in China 3' in
the same-titled paper. To trade off between low labor costs and poor supply chain
management in China, these firms are using the following models:
1. Cluster Approach, namely to ask their upstream companies to enter the China
market together with them;
2. Non-Chinese 3PL Approach, when the firms do not have the 'power to force or
convince their suppliers to follow them to China'; and
3. Localization, to outsource the supply chain issues to the local companies, or
simply set up their own supply chain division.
2.2.2. China Logistics Infrastructure
As the logistics business and market are growing fast in China, much has been discussed
about the current China logistics infrastructure, especially in the form of a market
overview. Gates reviewed China's distribution infrastructure, and provided some basic
numbers of the China logistics infrastructure.
In a paper titled 'Logistics development in China', Goh and Ling presented a detailed
review of the China logistics infrastructure, especially the current infrastructure
conditions and future development of rail, road, water, air, telecommunications, customs
and warehousing in China. They found that 'despite the improvements and
advancements.. .the current logistics infrastructures (of the above-mentioned sectors)...
are still lacking,' but the investments in the infrastructure were aggressive5 .
The China Logistics Report 2004 by the UK-based Transport Intelligence raised 10
significant challenges haunting the China logistics industry. They are:
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1. Poor Infrastructure;
2. Regulation;
3. Bureaucracy;
4. Poor Training;
5. Information Technology;
6. Undeveloped Domestic Industry;
7. High Transport Costs;
8. Poor Warehousing and Storage;
9. Regional Imbalance; and
10. Domestic Trade Barriers.
2.2.3. Foreign Investments and Local Responses
In addition to a huge number of news reports on foreign investments in the China
logistics market, there are some papers that have more strategic views about the market.
Jiang and Prater discussed the existing problems of China's distribution system, and also
tried to project the general future development of the industry . The booming economy,
the increasing use of the Internet, the WTO entrance and the policies favoring export-
oriented businesses all promote the attraction of international logistics providers.
However, the paper did not answer how the ILCs would invest in China. Hertzell, in his
report titled 'China's Evolving Logistics Landscape', suggested forming alliances and
7'
organization building as 'ways to approach the (China logistics) market
In an unpublished article, Clifford summarized some criteria when a foreign logistics
company seeks to form a joint venture in China. His extensive consulting career for the
China logistics industry leads him to state that partner's quality, network capacity,
relationships, strategic fit and likelihood of forming a partnership are the five major
8considerations
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But there are few papers or reports on how foreign logistics providers will in general
invest and operate in China, and especially how local companies will interact with and
respond to foreign logistics companies' movement. While people expect a dynamic
logistics industry in China, how Chinese local companies and foreign logistics firms will
interact with each other, and how the dynamics will be like, still remains a not well-
discussed issue.
15
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Chapter 3. Blueprint of China's Logistics Market
This chapter discusses the history of China's logistics market player components, and the
timeframe of the market opening.
3.1. Pre-WTO Accession
This section briefly examines the evolution of China's logistics industry.
3.1.1. State-Owned Enterprises
Before the late-1980's, the concept of 'logistics' was nothing more than transportation
and warehousing9 , and China's 'logistics' market was dominated by Chinese state-owned
enterprises (SOEs) in the leading regions, mainly Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai and
Guangzhou.
The representatives of these logistics companies were China National Foreign Trade
Transportation Co (Sinotrans)' 0 , China Ocean Shipping Company (COSCO), China
Materials Storage and Transportation Co (CMST), and China Post etc. They were the
'tier-i' players, and had branches in provincial capital and medium-sized cities that
developed the 'tier-2' players, and more local operators in small towns and cities ('tier-
3'). The vertical system is still operating in today's China'1 . These largest SOEs are still
12
controlling over 90% of China's domestic logistics market'.
Logistics outsourcing was rare - expect for one SOE to 'outsource' transportation or
warehousing business to another SOE. This phenomenon had its historical root. Under
the planned economy model copied from the USSR, SOEs together with less important
collective enterprises, were responsible for the whole nation's economic activities. The
rest of the non-logistics SOEs tended to handle all relevant business and non-business
affairs (child care, school, health, catering etc). Fleet and warehouse were usually an
indispensable part of many enterprises' activities'3 .
17
3.1.2. Private Companies
As China loosened its restrictions in the economy, private (compared to 'state-owned')
sectors became active. Since 1980's, common Chinese citizens and private companies
were allowed to operate vehicles and warehouses for commercial purpose. By the end of
1980's or in the early 1990's, many traditional transportation or warehousing companies
switched to comprehensive logistics companies, among which Datian W. Group (DTW)
and PG Logistics Group (PGL) are the representatives that grew to be national players.
The concept of 'logistics' has become popular since the middle 1990's, when advanced
logistics practices were introduced to China from America, Japan and Europe. But the
logistics services are mainly limited to integrated physical distribution, although some are
attempting Just-In-Time (JIT), Vendor Managed Inventory (VMI) or supply chain
management and consulting.
3.1.3. Foreign Players and Joint Ventures
As China gave more room for domestic private economy, she also opened the market to
foreign firms. International firms first entered the China logistics industry in the early
1980's, and flooded into China in the 1990's. A majority of largest international logistics
companies have operations in China now.
The first phase was generally for the foreign firms to set up representative offices in
Shanghai or Beijing, in the 1980's, in order to better understand the China market,
business and politics cultures and explore business opportunities. For example, DHL
entered China market as early as 1981, but only after 1986 did DHL start its business
operation in the form of a joint venture with Sinotrans, a state-owned company then
specializing in freight forwarding and ocean shipping.
Coincidently, the world's four largest courier service providers, UPS, FedEx, DHL and
TNT all chose Sinotrans as their first partner when they initiated business in China.
Because China hadn't opened its logistics market (including the courier and parcel
service), joint venture was the only choice. As the biggest Chinese player in the logistics
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field, Sinotrans has a national network, and its business is mostly import and export-
oriented. Thus Sinotrans became the best choice. As an executive of DHL put it, it's best
to find a right partner when you want to enter a new market (China) Sinotrans was the
right one, though it's not necessarily the right one now - Sinotrans is no longer the sole
channel for international logistics players to enter the China market.
Table 4 Four international logistics com lanies in China
DHL (DPWN) UPS TNT (TPG) FedEx
Entry China 1981 1988 N/A 1984
(Agency)
Joint Venture
with Sinotrans 1986 1996 1988 1986
JV Terminated 2052(?) 12/2004 5/2003 1995
Market Share 37% 15% N/A 20%
Source: websites of each company including Sinotrans; Dow Jones & Co.; various news
reports
After more than 18 years of partnering with Sinotrans, DHL (now a part of Deutsche Post
World Net) has the biggest share of courier and parcel service in China. The business has
been growing at 35%-50% in the past years, and its market share reaches over 37%, by
far leading the followers: FedEx, UPS, and TNT.
3.2. Schedules of China's Logistics Industry Opening
After China's accession to the WTO, China is gradually opening its logistics market.
However, just as Bolton, Wei 15 and Transportation Intelligence pointed out, regulation, or
regulatory fragmentation, is always a big issue in China 16. Before we go into any details
of the business dynamics, it's necessary to first learn what ILCs can do in China, and the
timeline of what they can do in the future. Understanding feasible business scope will
illustrate how far international logistics companies can go in China, and what kind of
activities they will possibly take. The following table is a brief list of China's
commitment to open the logistics market.
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Table 5 Schedule of China's Logistics Opening
Services 12/2004, Conditions 12/2005, Conditions
Joint Venture Companies (JVCs) permitted to operate PRC-
flagged fleet,
foreign investment not to exceed 49%. Chair of the board and
General Manager of the company shall be appointed by Chinese
Maritime Services side
Marime Cargo
Handling, Custom
Clearance, Container
Station & Depot
Service JVCs with foreign majority permitted
Marine Agency JVCs with maximum 49% of foreign investment
Internal Water Not allowed. Only international shipping in ports open to foreign
Transport vessels permitted
Freight Transport by
Road 100% foreign equity permitted commencing 12/2004
Freight Transport by Majority foreign equity 100% foreign equity permitted
Rail permitted commencing 12/2007
Warehousing &
Storage, Packing 100% foreign equity permitted commencing 12/2004
Wholly foreign-owned subsidiaries
ourier and Parcel permitted to handle international
Services parcel and courier services;
(except for those however, there is no clear
currently specifically indication that these company can
eserved to or cannot deliver domestic parcels
Chinese postal Foreign majority allowed; and couriers. That's a grey area
authorities international parcel and that international players can take
by law, namely letters) courier service only advantage of.
Foreign majority equity
allowed, the foreign partner
Freight Forwarding must have consecutive 3
Agency years' experience. 100% foreign equity permitted
Source: Part II - Schedule of Specific Commitments on Services, Addendum 2 to the
Report of the Working Party on the Accession of China, dated 1 October 2001, by
Working Party on the Accession of China, World Trade Organization. Ministry of
Commerce, PRC. [online]: http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/table/wto/03.doc, 12/3/2004.
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3.2.1. Civil Aviation
Civil aviation is not governed by relevant WTO documents, and the table does not
contain relevant information. It is a bilateral issue between countries. Theoretically,
China allows foreign investors to invest in'7 :
1. public air transport on condition that the Chinese side controls the air transport
enterprise with one foreign investment not exceeding 25%; and
2. airport infrastructures that the Chinese side controls.
In spite of this regulation, it's hard to obtain a license from the Chinese authority for a
joint venture in this industry. It requires political culture to understand this phenomenon.
In other words, with the above rules, foreign investors now have the legitimate ground to
file an application of investment in the field or a license for aviation operations, but the
relevant authorities can always find reasons to postpone processing or declining it.
However, the bilateral agreement is real and tangible. Under the US-Sino Aviation
Agreement signed on July 24, 2004, the number of flights between USA and China will
'soar to 249 a week from the existing 54 within six years, among which 111 will be
freight carriers' 8 .' For example, UPS hoped to triple its 6 China-USA freight flights per
week by March 200519, and FedEx hoped to increase its 11 flights per week to 23 by the
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end of 2004
3.2.2. Third Party Logistics Service
In order to introduce advanced management techniques and logistics technologies to
China, on June 20, 2002, China government issued The Notice on Issues Related to the
Launch of Pilot Projects for the Establishment of Foreign-Invested Logistics Enterprises,
via the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation. According to this Notice,
JVCs with foreign majority ownership are permitted, with a minimum registered capital
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of $5 million, to include and integrate the following areas/services to provide a one-stop,
comprehensive supply chain:
* Transport
* Storage
* Loading/unloading
* Processing
* Packing
* Delivery
* Relevant information processing
* Consulting for general road cargoes
* Domestic freight forwarding
* Managing and operating of logistics business with computer network.
This notice overlaps some of China's WTO documents/commitments, but is more
flexible. For this reason, 3PL service was initially restricted to cities of Beijing, Shanghai,
Tianjin, Chongqing and Shenzhen, and the provinces of Jiangsu, Zhejiang and
Guangdong. While China allows these JVCs to set up subsidiaries in other cities/regions
in China, there is in fact no restriction on regions where foreign investors can operate.
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Chapter 4. Players in the China Logistics Market
This chapter discusses the different leading players in the China logistics market.
4.1. Chinese Players
Traditionally, China's logistics market is dominated by the state-owned enterprises
(SOEs). It is estimated that in today's China, these SOEs are still providing 90% of the
logistics services, but none of these has a market share over 2%. The market is very
fragmented, and there is no dominant logistics company.
4.1.1. State-Owned Players
4.1.1.1. Sinotrans & China National Foreign Trade Transportation (Group) Co.
( Sinotrans Group)
Sinotrans (the group) was founded in 1950, one year after the foundation of the People's
Republic of China. It integrates land, sea and air freight forwarding, provides ocean, air,
road, rail and multi-modal transportation and express service, charters and manages ships,
owns and leases warehouses, and serves as the ship agent in Chinese sea ports. It is one
of China's giant state-owned companies that report to the State-owned Assets
Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council.
Sinotrans Group has a vast network in China (about 1000 subsidiaries) and abroad (about
30 offices), and has partnerships with 400 international agents. Its main assets are: a fleet
of ships of over 2 million deadweight tons and of about 5000 vehicles; warehousing of
over 6 million square meters, 59 container yards, 89 railway tracks, and 87 private ports
and berths.
In February 2003, it had about 38% of its equity listed in Hong Kong Stock Exchange
under the name of Sinotrans, of which 10% was offered to Sinotrans' strategic partners
DHL, UPS and Exel. DHL (DPWN) alone accounted for 5% (half) of the 10%.
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4.1.1.2. China Material Storage and Transportation Co. (CMST)
Similar to Sinotrans whose full company name starts with 'China', it's a state-owned
company too. In the past four decades, CMST has evolved into a warehousing,
distribution and retailing, processing, delivery, freight forwarding, import and export, and
integrated logistics service provider. It has 64 warehouses with an area of 2 million
square meters, freight yardage of 4.5 million square meters, and 129 private rail tracks.
4.1.1.3. COSCO Logistics
COSCO Logistics is a branch of COSCO, China Ocean Shipping Company. It was
formed in 2002. Because of the parent company's network and infrastructure, in 2004 it
ranked number 1 in China in terms of comprehensive logistics capacities. COSCO
Logistics has 300 logistics facilities, covering 90% of the China market. The service is
strongly marine transport related.
4.1.1.4. China Post Logistics & China Courier Service Corporation (CCSC)
China Post Logistics is a subsidiary of the State Postal Bureau. It was incorporated in
2003, and by integrating the State Postal Bureau's infrastructures and network, it has a
nationwide network with over 20 province-level branches. Services include transport,
warehousing, packaging/processing, distribution.
CCSC was formed in 1985, providing EMS (Express Mail) service. It has operations in
more than 2,000 cities in China and has business agents in 200 countries. It owns over
10,000 vehicles, 3 sorting facilities in Shanghai, Beijing and Guangzhou.
As an arm of the State Postal Bureau, it monopolized the domestics parcel and express
service, and is most impacted by the logistics opening policy. As a result, CCSC and
China Post Logistics are considering merging to form a more efficient network and
provide more integrated services.
4.1.1.5. China Rail Loeisitcs
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Founded in 2002, China Rail Logistics is initiated by China Rail Material Supply
Company, one of the affiliated companies of the Ministry of Rail. The revenue of 2003
was about $100 million.
The company has regional companies in China's transportation center cities, operates
over 400 distribution centers (DCs) and operational units. It provides 3PL, large-scale
project and value-adding logistics solutions. Based on the assets near the trunk railways,
the company has a network that can access the most part of China.
4.1.2. Private Players
The number of private Chinese logistics providers is big, but only a few are operating on
a nationwide scale.
4.1.2.1. Da Tian W Group (DTW)
DTW started operation in 1992 with air freight forwarding. In 1999, FedEx formed a
partnership with DTW because DTW had an air freight forwarding license. The license is
the 'pass' for FedEx to do air related business in China, and for this reason, every year
FedEx has to pay about $12 million dollars to DTW for the license.
Mainly thanks to this 'license fee', DTW evolved into a company with $119 million in
assets over a 12-year period from its original $18,000, with a fleet of 1500 vehicles,
warehouses of 200,000 square meters, and 93 subsidiaries all over China servicing over
500 cities. It has a management with diverse and international background. In 2001,
DTW set up its own express service network in addition to the FedEx-DTW joint venture.
4.1.2.2. PG Logistics (PGL)
PGL started its business as a small rail freight station with a humble origin in the middle
1980's. In 1994, it diversified its business to integrated logistics service provider. It has a
network of over 50 offices in China, and provides services to over 40 Fortune Global 500
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firms in China. In 2002 PGL recorded a turnover of $36.14 million, and is one of China's
largest private logistics companies.
PGL had a very close business relation with P&G. In PGL's early period, P&G
Guangzhou outsourced its logistics business to PGL while at the same time providing
hand-on experience in logistics management. PGL learned the logistics management
skills from P&G, its customer, and later expanded its integrated logistics services to
various MNCs in China.
4.1.2.3. ZJS Express
ZJS Express was founded in 1994, and is focused on courier service. After 10 years of
development, it now employs 8000 workers, owns 1500 vehicles, and has assets worth
$25 million. It has established a network of 300 offices in China covering over 2000
cities, towns and regions. In 2004, it recorded a turnover of over $75 million.
4.2. International Logistics Players
Although the indigenous companies dominate the general China logistics market, ILCs
are playing a more important role, and their market shares are increasing fast. Among
which the most important are the four giant ILCs that started with parcel and courier
services.
4.2.1. Deutsche Post World Net/DHL
Deutsche Post World Net (DPWN) has a uniformed brand and image for its logistics,
courier and parcel, and transport service; that is DHL. DHL was first an independent
brand called DHL Express, and the other components of DPWN include DHL Danzas Air
& Ocean (international air and ocean freight), DHL Solutions ('customized, IT-based
solutions along the whole supply chain' 21) and DHL Freight (road transportation); the
latter specializes in road transport and hasn't aggressively entered the China market.
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DHL first entered China in 1981. In 1986, it formed a joint venture with Sinotrans in
courier and parcel delivery. Mainly because of this earliest partnership, DHL-Sinotrans
has the biggest market share in courier service. Both parties enjoy a very fruitful
partnership. For this reason, in 2002 when the first partnership ended, DHL and Sinotrans
renewed the cooperation agreement for another 50 years, till the year of 2052. In May
2004, DHL initiated its domestic delivery of parcels in China, and again, DHL led the
market. In the courier and parcel delivery market, the partnership between DHL and
Sinotrans is the most stable.
In 1991, Danzas formed a joint venture (Danzas-ZF) with China Welfare Institute (ZF), a
non-profit organization headed by Deng Pufang, Deng Xiaoping's disabled son. In 1999,
as an important step in Deutsche Post World Net's global strategy, Deutsche Post
purchased Danzas. In 2002, Deutsche Post controlled DHL Express. DPWN entered the
China market with the existing DHL and Danzas network.
By the beginning of 2005, DPWN (DHL) has over 2-million sq. ft of warehousing and
DCs in China, covering over half of China's 34 provincial capitals. On 2/7/2005, another
facility was opened - DHL's Shanghai Waigaoqiao Bonded Logistics Park, adding one
more facility to DHL's physical distribution network.
In the past twenty years, DHL has invested about $215 million in China. Out of its total
investment of $1.1 billion in Asia, that was only about 20% of DHL's investment in Asia.
However, DHL plan to invest about $273 millions in China from 2004-2008, or almost
2/3 of its $400 million investment in Asia over the same period. Clearly, the investment
is heating up in the China logistics market.
Of the $273million investment plan, $215 will be used to strengthen DHL's logistics
infrastructure, which mainly includes vans, personal terminals, cargo hubs, turnover
warehouses (warehouses for fast moving items, where the commodities don't stay long)
and container stations. DHL currently has an air cargo hub in Shanghai, is expanding its
Guangzhou hub, and is constructing its third one in Beijing.
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In 2003, DHL acquired 5% of Sinotrans' shares with $58million, becoming Sinotrans'
biggest strategic investor. Sinotrans is China Sinotrans Group's Hong Kong listed
holding company, and is the China Sinotrans Group's core business unit. It provides
integrated logistics solutions and individual freight forwarding, ocean, air and road
transport, port and warehouse operation. It is China's leading logistics company with
nationwide network and facilities.
4.2.2. TPG/TNT
Similar to DHL, TNT is the uniformed brand of TPG (the TNT Post Group), together
with TNT logistics and TNT express services. This step was meant to promote a
uniformly recognized brand and maximize the brand image.
TPG entered the China market in the 1980's, and in 1988, formed a joint venture with
Sinotrans for express service. In May 2003, when the 15-year agreement with Sinotrans
ended, TPG terminated the cooperation with Sinotrans, and formed another joint venture
with a little-known, 4-year-old company. The loose relationship between TPG and
Sinotrans is believed to be the main cause. That is not only the reason for TNT to finally
break up with Sinotrans, but also the reason for FedEx and UPS as well. Because DHL is
Sinotrans' first partner, Sinotrans favors the partnership with DHL the best and made
efforts to strengthen the alliance. That's why Sinotrans-DHL has the largest market share
in the courier and parcel delivery.
In the field of integrated logistics service, TPG has a joint venture with the state-owned
Shanghai Automotive Industry Corporation (Group) (SAIC), a Fortune Global 500
company. Each of the two companies has a 50% share in this $30 million company
named Anji-TNT Automotive Logistics Co. In 2004, Anji-TNT signed a 5-year,
Euro100-million contract with Shanghai Volkswagen Automobile Corporation, one of
Shanghai Automotive Industry Corporation (Group)'s joint venture with the Germany
automotive giant. As a result of the joint venture partners, it is hoped that this first pot of
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gold will generate a snow ball effect for the company. Anji-TNT is now China's largest
automotive logistics company.
4.2.3. Federal Express
FedEx entered the China market in 1984, and also formed a JV with Sinotrans. In 1995,
23FedEx left Sinotrans, because it was unsatisfied with Sinotrans' policy favoring DHL .
FedEx established another JV with a leading logistics company called EAS, and in
November 1999, FedEx parted with EAS to form a third JV in China with the then little
known Da Tian W. Air Service Corporation (now DTW Group, or DTW for short). The
joint venture FedEx-DTW is FedEx's only joint venture in its global presence.
Because DTW had an air freight operator's license, FedEx got a ticket to enter China's
courier and logistics service market after leaving Sinotrans and EAS. Because FedEx had
to split its profit and share with DTW at V100-million (about $12.08-million) a year (for
the license, or the market entry), DTW was able to quickly expand its nationwide
network in just a few years, and has become one of China's leading private logistics
companies.
In November 2003, FedEx and Kodak China declared a strategic alliance. By 2004, about
9,200 Kodak stores in China started collecting parcels for FedEx. This alliance helped
FedEx expand its reach almost to small, rural towns.
In December 2003, FedEx signed a Framework Agreement with China's Guangzhou
Baiyun International Airport. Though FedEx renewed its Subic Bay (in the Philippines)
Cargo Hub for another 3 years as its Asia-Pacific hub, FedEx is seriously evaluating the
development trend in China and, this agreement offers 'an elastic option for our future
development', and the renewal of the agreement with Subic Bay Cargo Hub 'does not
mean we have made a long-term decision', as David Cunningham, FedEx Asia Pacific
President put it, after signing the renewal agreement with the Pilipino government on
May 31, 2004 . After the new Sino-US Air Accord signed in July 2004, FedEx had its
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12 new lines approved by the US Federal Transportation Committee, and in 2004 FedEx
launched its first 6 lines to China, all assigned to Guangzhou Baiyun International Airport.
On November 17, 2004, FedEx officially announced the opening of its FedEx China
Business Region office in Shanghai. This is FedEx's only Business Region office of this
kind its global network. This office has a CEO, a CFO, a CIO, human resources officers
as well as sales and technical support divisions; and is to command all of FedEx's
business development in China 25 . From the number of employees, a complete set of
senior officers and business divisions, this office looks more like a regional head office
than a typical business office 26. After the opening of the China Business Region, FedEx
Asia-Pacific was divided into 3 components: North Pacific, South Pacific and China. We
can see from this division how strategically important China is to FedEx.
4.2.4. United Parcel Service
UPS formed a JV with Sinotrans very late, and the breakup came late too. On December
2, 2004, UPS agreed to pay Sinotrans $100-million and buy out the JV's customers. The
price will be paid in three installments: 40% ($40-million) on 12/31/2004, 10% ($10-
million) on 12/31/2005 and the rest 50% ($50-million) on 12/31/2006. This UPS-buyout
will grant UPS the direct control over the fast-growing China market and existing
Chinese customers. The next day after the declaration of the transaction, the stock price
of the Hong Kong listed China Sinotrans Ltd dropped 7%.
Commencing January 2005, UPS will take over the customer relations directly in five
Chinese major cities (Shanghai, Guangzhou, Shenzhen, Tianjin and Qingdao). By
December 2005, UPS will directly manage the customer relations in all 23 operational
cities under the current UPS-Sinotrans joint venture. This transaction covers 200
important Chinese cities that account for 85% of China's GDP. Coincidently, by
December 2005, China will eliminate its last barrier in domestic parcel service.
On January 27, 2005, UPS reported a 100% business growth in the China market in 2004,
whereas its global business climbed by only 9.2%27.
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Chapter 5. Future Strategies Analysis
This chapter is the core of the thesis. It describes the strategies of the players in the China
logistics industry.
5.1. International Players
Richard Armstrong, the president of the Wisconsin-based 3PL research firm, Armstrong
& Associates, said, "3PLs that expect to be competitive with major customers all have
stepped up their strategic plans for global expansion," among which China is a focus28
This allegation coincides with giant ILCs' plan. UPS Asia Pacific President Ken Torok
said, 'China is ... a must to UPS, not a choice 2 9 '. More evident is TNT's strategy
statement30-
We intend to develop new home markets and other growth opportunities to solidify
our position and to offer exciting career opportunities to our talented employees. We
have identified three key areas for growth: China, freight forwarding and postal
consolidation.
TNT plans to increase the number of subsidiaries in China from the present 25 offices to
100 by 2010, covering 1000 cities, employ 10,000 from currently 2500, establish a fleet
of 2500 vehicles, and increase the warehouse space to 3.25million square meters.
In a fast growing market, an extensive presence ensures reach to customers. This is more
important to ILCs as a foreign player in the market. Service coverage means market share.
How to quickly establish an extensive presence in a short time becomes the top priority
for international players.
In general, ILCs have aggressive plans in China. This section analyzes the strategies that
the international players are taking and will take to enter, expand and play in the China
market.
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5.1.1. Strategies for Infrastructure Growth
As an executive of UPS said in an interview with the author, 'if we are not supposed to
establish our domestic network (in China), what's the goodness of our business? Why
cannot our customers bypass us and directly look for the 3PL providers that have (the
network)?'
For the international players to stand firm in the China market, excellent logistics
experience and solution is only a part of the success story. Since logistics involves the
'flow and storage' of goods (CLM), logistics providers also need physical infrastructures
to support their service and expansion.
5.1.1.1. Direct Investment
Direct investment in facilities, such as distribution centers, logistics parks or sea/air ports,
is a way to establish a physical presence. The international logistics companies usually
first set up a bridgehead in the Yangtze River Delta (Shanghai) or the Pearl River Delta
(Shenzhen), and then enlarge their network as soon as opportunities arise. This is self-
explanatory: Yangtze River Delta is China's most economically dynamic region, and the
Pearl River Delta is China's largest export-oriented economic region. The establishment
in these regions can also help the ILCs reach the rest of China.
From Table 1 in Chapter 2, we have noticed that the average investment amount in
logistics is number 2 in all categories, only after that in real estate. Here are a few
examples of direct investments:
DHL is building its Shanghai hub, is expanding its Guangzhou hub, and is
planning to build a Beijing hub. In addition to a $100 million Asian hub opened in
Hong Kong in August 2004, DHL invested another 15,000 sq. m logistics center
in Shanghai Waigaoqiao Bonded Area after a 16,500 sq. m logistics center in
Beijing airport. This new center was opened on 2/7/2005, two days before
Chinese Lunar New Year.
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* FedEx will soon decide whether or not to use Guangzhou Baiyun International
Airport as its Asian cargo hub.
* UPS has already declared that it will open a hub in Shanghai by 2007. In addition,
UPS will use $500 million in 2005 and 2006 to build 20 new warehouse and
distribution facilities'.
* Maersk has invested 4 ports in mainland China, including Qingdao, Shanghai,
Shenzhen Yantian and Dalian. The container berth that Maersk invests in
Shanghai alone costs V2.4 billion (about $290 million).
However, direct investment takes a long time to evaluate projects, approve and construct
facilities before they can be launched into use. Direct investment also involves huge
capitals, and requires a long period to recover the entire investment. For example,
highways, bridges or ports may take 20-50 years to break even. Only the largest logistics
companies are willing, and able to afford such long-term direct investment.
5.1.1.2. Merger &Acquisition
The quickest way to establish an existence and expand is through merger or acquisition,
which enables the acquirer to own a network over night. It has been a very popular
strategy for the ILCs in the China market, if not a dominant strategy so far.
M&A has been a theme for ILCs' growth and expansion. Here is a list of recent M&A
examples:
* UPS bought Fritz (2001, $450 million), and Menlo (2004, $150 million cash +
$110 million debt)
* FedEx bought Kinko's (2004, $2.4 billion)
* TNT acquired Wilson (2004, Euro 257 million <about $310 million>)
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* DHL (DPWN) spent over $11 billion in the past 7 years to acquire, including
Danzas ($840 million, 1999), DHL Express ($2.7 billion, 2002), and Airborne
($1.05 billion, 2003).
In a recent public interview 2, the managing director for strategic planning and
development for UPS in China said, 'UPS' future expansion in China may involve
acquisitions of either international or local companies'. And Klaus Zumwinkel, the CEO
of DWPN, replied in an interview, 'we will consider (M&A) if there are suitable (target)
enterprises.' His two criterias are: 1). strategic fit and core business fit; and 2). return on
investment over 15%.
The titles of positions clearly illustrate the attraction of this approach. For example, TNT
has a director for merger and acquisition for its China operation, and DHL has a position
of (China) National Development Manager, as does UPS.
TNT has a Euro200-million investment plan in China. This amount will mainly be used
to acquire 'substantial players 33 in the logistics field. If these targets don't have a
nationwide network, they shall at least be a 'leading regional company with a potential
for national expansion'. Right now TNT is negotiating for acquiring a Chinese logistics
company. No more information about the target company is provided, except that its
revenue is about $100-million. In China, less than 10 logistics companies have revenue of
over $100 million. For example, a logistics company with revenue of $55-million ranks
number 12 in China's Top 100 Logistics Companies, and a Beijing-based company with
revenue of $25million in 2003 ranks number 39. All the top 10 logistics companies have
a national network.
In general, DHL has a different strategy. In an interview with the author, a DHL
executive said that generally DHL does not acquire any local or regional companies.
They only aim at global companies. But China will be an exception for DHL. Although
DHL has no immediate acquisition plan, things could change in the near future (about 2
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years from now, as defined by the DHL executive). In considering DHL's acquisition
targets, DHL emphasized two factors: 1), a good balance sheet, and a nice customer base
especially those foreign invested enterprises or joint ventures with foreign equities; and
2), expertise in a special area such as electronic products logistics. Although DHL did not
disclose the name of any company that DHL has targeted, the DHL executive repeatedly
mentioned a specific company. All information about that company flowed very naturally
from his memory, including the size, revenue, network, customers (sino-foreign JVs,
solely foreign-owned enterprises), service scope and expertise, and development
potentials. The knowledge about that company indicated DHL's long-lasting interest and
focus - although DHL hasn't started negotiating for the acquisition, they have observed
their target for a long time. They have an acquisition blueprint for their next major
movement in China.
5.1.1.3. Franchising
Oxford English Dictionary so denotes: 'Franchising ... has become a method of very
quickly establishing a distributive network for a product or service.' Since logistics
services heavily depend on the distribution channels, it's very appealing to leverage
franchising in the logistics industry.
An executive, the Director for Mergers & Acquisitions of TNT China, said on 2/2/2005
during a telephone interview that TNT has many plans in China. Among which the main
effort is to franchise its business. TNT hopes to introduce it to the China market in spring
of 2005. Literarily, franchising means 'the authorization granted to an individual or group
by a company to sell its products or services in a particular area'(Oxford English
Dictionary). In the logistics industry, there are a number of possibilities, but not limited
to, as follows:
1. network of facilities such as distribution centers or warehouses as franchising
members;
2. transport capacities such as small or medium size trucking companies as
franchising members under the uniform brand of TNT;
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3. service chains like 7-11, such as dispersed, unorganized individual stores as
franchising members, etc.
Because the franchising model is very special to TNT (and the logistics industry), and it
is 'in a very important phase'35 for TNT to carry out the franchising model, TNT did not
disclose too much information about this model. It is said that this franchising model is
aimed at quickly establishing a trucking network covering the entire China, as there
hasn't been a national player in the China trucking market.
According to the information available to the public, by the franchising, TNT hopes to
make a 'breakthrough in the express service, expand its network, and set a foot in China's
second and third tier cities, while establishing bases in major Chinese cities'. The
franchising fees are set at Y100,000 (about $12,085), the franchising period is five years,
and the franchising partners will need to complete integrated, comprehensive training. It
is reported that the franchising will become TNT's major model in China 6.
5.1.1.4. Strategic Alliance
As described in previous chapter, FedEx took a different approach to expand its network
reach. The strategic alliance with Kodak was innovative yet unsurprising. These two
companies can compensate for each other: Kodak has a long established network that
penetrates the communities and neighborhood (which logistics companies are usually not
very accessible to), and FedEx has a long-range international reach. The alliance will
probably benefit FedEx more than Kodak - an international reach may not interest Kodak
very much.
All ILCs formed different forms of strategic alliances when they first entered the China
market in the 1980's and 1990's, as China did not allow their independent operations.
ILCs had to form strategic alliance with local logistics companies, only in order to gain
the access to the market. As China's policy changes, the nature of strategic alliance will
change.
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When the market is open, the necessity of such an alliance to enter a market will no
longer exist, but strategic alliance can still compensate for the partners' weaknesses such
as infrastructure (facility, warehouse etc), network (reach for the remote region, for
example), capacity (ability to offer different services to common customers), etc. For this
reason, strategic alliances will still prevail, which will be discussed in later sections in
details.
5.1.2. Strategies for Business Growth
The ultimate pursuit of expanding physical infrastructure is to service the customers
better. These two sides of the logistics service - infrastructure and customer network -
are closely interrelated. Without an extensive infrastructure network, ILCs can't serve
their customers better; without a large customer network, there is no need for a large
infrastructure.
5.1.2.1. Strategic Alliance
Section 5.1.1.4. discusses strategic alliance as a means to the infrastructure network
growth; it is also an effective tool to expand the customers, or secure long-term
cooperation in the logistics business. The ILCs first entered China just as partners of
other foreign investors, such as manufacturing firms like Motorola and retailers like KFC
etc, to meet their needs. This co-existence will continue. Neither the customers nor the
providers could live without each other.
This correlation is very evident in FedEx's case - the alliance with Kodak. When FedEx
had about 9200 Kodak stores under its umbrella as a result of the alliance, its reach
expanded explosively overnight. Customers who originally would turn to other sources
for the service now could access FedEx. Converting these customers to FedEx becomes
much easier.
However, strategic alliance can take different forms. Joint venture is one. This is the form
most often employed by ILCs when the market was not open. Now, a JV can still bring
significant benefits. JVs can facilitate the 'quick entry.' Although there are many other
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factors in forming a JV, the quick pace of a JV is one of the most important factors. This
approach is very attractive to small and medium ILCs that may not have the capital to
buy, but want to extend their services and network3 7
That does not mean JV is not appealing to the giant ILCs. JVs facilitate the access to
certain markets, or quick building of, customers. For example, even though UPS bought
out the customers in regions that generate over 85% of China's GDP, UPS and Sinotrans
will continue cooperating in the rest of the regions (of 15% of China's GDP) where UPS'
current network is not able to reach. At the same time, on 12/29/2004, Nippon Yusen
Kaisha (NYK) formed a new JV with Shanghai Automotive Industry Corporation (Group)
(SAIC) 38, the company that has a JV with TNT. If TNT can obtain a Euro100-million
contract through the TNT-SAIC joint venture, it's natural for NYK to access similar
long-term contracts through the joint venture, especially when people expect China to
become the world's second largest automobile market; by 2010, China will manufacture
3910-15 million automobiles
5.1.2.2. Merger & Acquisition and Buyout
Just as ILCs merge or acquire in order to develop infrastructure, or as ILCs form strategic
alliances to access customers, acquisition is helpful in establishing the customer network.
In the UPS' buyout from Sinotrans, the main purpose is for 'UPS to buy the customers at
$100 million'. Sinotrans recognizes that in the past, the customers belonged to the
Sinotrans-UPS joint venture, and the buyout was to ensure the smooth transfer of these
customers.
Observers predict that in the near future, merger and acquisition will be a theme for the
ILCs to enter the China market. A most recent example is EAS, formerly a partner of
FedEx in the second half of 1990's. On January 20, 2005, Kerry Logistics acquired EAS,
one of China's leading logistics companies. Kerry Logistics is a logistics company under
the Southeast Asian richest billionaire's enterprise tree.
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Sagawa Express serves as a very unique yet interesting example in trying to expand the
customer network. It took different approaches at different times in China.
Sagawa formed a JV with a giant Chinese state-owned company with a paid up capital of
$10-million in the summer of 2004. It soon 'found' that it had been 'operating' in China
for many years and about 900 companies in the Yangtze Delta Region were its 'agents'.
In the past when Sagawa was not strong enough, it acquiescently allowed these small
'agents' to use its brand and logo to market the service, although these 'agents' also did
business via UPS, TNT or FedEx. Now that Sagawa has a reputation and is able to do
business in China through a strong JV, Sagawa wants to integrate the agency channel.
That's why in late 2004, Sagawa sent numerous legal letters to these 'agents', warning
that Sagawa would sue them if they did not stop infringing on Sagawa.
But Sagawa soon changed its strategy. It demanded these 'agents' to switch to Sagawa as
a sole agent (which means these agents can only do business within Sagawa's network
and system; they are not allowed to use other channels like DHL, TNT or UPS).
As one 'agent' analyzed, Sagawa had trouble setting up its own network, and it also took
time and huge cost to establish its own network, so Sagawa did not intervene in their
business in the past. Now Sagawa wants the small agents as sole agents to help Sagawa
develop customers and increase its market share. This is another kind of 'merger or
acquisition', although the result is still pending whether this strategy works or not.
If this strategy is successful, Sagawa will soon set up its solely owned or controlled
distribution network, without taking too much time or spending too much money.
5.1.2.3. Independence
As the market opens, and regulatory restrictions and market access are no longer a
problem, the question becomes, 'what should my operating mode be'? Some foreign
logistics firms have already decided to pursue the WOFE (wholly-owned foreign
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enterprise) approach4 1 . Independent operation is a theme for many ILCs, especially those
who have operated for many years through JV.
Independence, however, is not a revolution that could take place overnight. It is a long-
term strategy, and there is a clear track that we can trace in the case of FedEx and TNT.
In 2003, TNT terminated the cooperation with Sinotrans. It formed a JV with a 4-year old,
very small (800 employees altogether), little-known company called 'Ultra Mach'. This
is not a match at all, as TNT had a history of over 250 years and revenue close to $15
billion in 2003. No other reason can explain this kind of asymmetric 'marriage'. The
partnership between Ultra Mach and TNT is equal to TNT's advanced independent
operation in China, except that it aligned with Chinese laws by a 'legal coat'. This kind of
partnership will allow TNT's independent operation in China immediately after China
opens the market. There is no bargaining space for the small partners, and the price that
TNT has to pay to a small partner will be minimal, compared to that of a large partner.
The ILCs started their plan for independence before the market opening, and FedEx is far
ahead of its competitor TNT. After leaving Sinotrans, FedEx first chose a partnership
with a weaker-than-Sinotrans logistics company EAS. After three years, FedEx chose a
weaker-than-EAS logistics company DTW, although DTW is now a leading company.
Similar to TNT, FedEx's strategy is also to form JV with weaker partners, not strong
ones.
Another rationale is that unlike large partners, small partners have little stake at the
negotiation table. The ILCs then do not have to worry about losing control of the joint
venture. The ILCs can concentrate on the core business and vastly increase market share
as quickly as possible.
During an interview, a UPS Asia-Pacific executive said that UPS is launching a campaign
in China called 'Brown Initiative'. This campaign targets at direct operations that will
eliminate the words 'joint venture' and 'agent' from its dictionary in most regions of
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China. UPS will have its own fleet and service people with the UPS brand and logo,
finally leading to 'the first foreign company to have a wholly owned operation in the
express parcel business in China 2, when by the end of 2005 China lifts the restrictions
on ownership.
DHL renewed a cooperation agreement, because the joint venture of Sinotrans-DHL is
the market leader and it is unreasonable to expect DHL to give up this leading position
and seek independent operation. However, out of the four giant ILCs that formed JVs
with Sinotrans, three have terminated the cooperation with Sinotrans. FedEx left
Sinotrans in 1995, TNT in 2003 and UPS in 2004.
5.1.3. Service Enhancement
For the purpose of this research, the author interviewed four executives (one from UPS,
TNT, DHL respectively, and another from Amway China Limited as the customer of
logistics services). All of them believe that the ILCs' main customers are MNCs, not
local companies. This positioning is reasonable, given the fact that a majority of Fortune
Global 500 has offices and facilities in China, and China's import and export volume
reached $1 trillion.
Traditionally, the ILCs are the shadow of the MNCs, and the ILCs 'serve primarily
multinational companies'4 3 . In the 1980's, as a result of China's opening policy, and to
take advantages of China's low-cost labor, MNCs started manufacturing in China. The
initial market for these products was not China, however. ILCs entered China logistics
market to meet the international distribution needs, to ship the products from China to
their ultimate destinations in Europe or North America. For example, UPS and Motorola
are long-term global strategic partners. When Motorola established its manufacturing
facilities in China, UPS naturally hoped to follow Motorola to pursue the logistics service.
Without the feed of MNCs to ILCs, the ILCs would have problem surviving in China;
without the support of ILCs, the MNCs would have suffered severe supply chain
problems.
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As more MNCs establish business in China and China gradually becomes one of the
markets for the products, the supply chains of the MNCs will get increasingly
complicated. The need for sophisticated in-China and cross-border logistics and supply
chain management remains strong, even though an increasing number of Chinese
indigenous logistics companies will be sharing the market.
Given the limits of the ILCs that will be discussed in the Appendix (Financing
Warehousing), ILCs will focus on enhancing their sophisticated services to the MNCs to
draw the highest return. For example, TNT-i Solution refers to the integrated service
under one company. The solution specifically includes the high-value air freight
forwarding that generally generates a 4-6% profit compared to sea's 1-2%.
Expertise in a certain field is another effective strategy for ILCs to manage their
resources more efficiently. For example, TNT wants to excel in the automotive logistics,
and it does succeed in achieving this goal - to become China's largest automotive
logistics service provider. FedEx and DHL are more focused on high-value spare parts
inventory management, and UPS aims at 'high-value, high-technology commodities .'
As these ILCs usually have advanced technologies and management techniques, these
expert services can help the ILCs concentrate on one field and achieve the best return.
The generally high-value commodities like automotive products, electronics or spare
parts need high value-adding and time sensitive services. These services conversely will
generate high return for these ILCs. Given the limited hands and high costs, this strategy
makes more sense to them. This strategy will produce loyalty among the customers, and
contrarily, also attracts peripheral services: transportation, supply chain consulting, etc.
5.1.4. Talent - the Constraint
Before the mid 1990's, there was no concept of 'logistics' in China. This resulted in the
shortage of logistics professionals. Although in the recent years the government and
educational institutions initiated many logistics education programs, the number of newly
forged logisticians cannot meet the market demand. The insufficient supply of well
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educated logistics professionals will be a big constraint and challenge in a long term. Ken
McCall, TNT China CEO, estimated that by 2010, China will need one million logistics
professionals, but there are only about 50,000 in reserve. In contrast, some Chinese
researches claim that China lacks 6 million logistics professionals, and for those senior
logistics managers and logistics professionals with IT background, the demand will grow
at 15% per year4 5 . How to train and retain the talent becomes a critical factor in the ILCs'
success in China.
It is intuitive to use high salaries to attract professionals. ILCs can always offer salaries
higher than what the Chinese indigenous local or state-owned companies can. However,
given the extremely limited number of quality people, even high salaries cannot buy
enough talent. The ILCs will need to recruit employees from various educational
backgrounds, and lower their requirements. For example, a certificate or diploma in
logistics cannot be a prerequisite to employment, and there aren't enough diploma or
certificate holders to cater to such a requirement.
In-house training offers a viable and realistic solution. This may be the only viable
solution. TNT has a clear training strategy. In November 2004, the TNT China University,
an alliance with Aetna School of Management of Shanghai Jiaotong University, was
officially launched. TNT also has an Internship Program, which is very unique among the
foreign enterprises in China, and an internal Exchange Program with TNT Europe and
North America. The University and the two programs will train TNT's Chinese
employees, and the long-term target is to train logistics professionals for TNT's
sustainable development in China. Other firms have similar in-house training programs.
As TNT has a franchising plan in which each franchising member shall enroll in a
training program, the shortage of talent will be alleviated, or, in another word, the number
of trained professional will grow along with the business growth.
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5.1.5. Conclusion
China interests the ILCs as it becomes a world economic 'powerhouse'. ILCs are trying
various means to entering, exploring, and expanding in this market. However diverse the
approaches are, the main theme across ILCs is expansion, whether infrastructure,
customers, services and talent. The main purpose of their current strategy is independence.
5.2. Chinese Logistics Companies
Compared to the giant international counterparts, CLCs are operating at a very
preliminary scale. According to the Ministry of Commerce of China, there are about
730,000 registered firms with a word 'logistics' in their company names, but only a few
are operating with scalable economy. Most of these large companies are controlled by
either the central government or local governments, and a few are privately owned. The
rest of the majority are purely transportation or warehouse companies that may own one
truck or one small warehouse. The state statistics show that in 2002, China had registered
5.36 million trucks under 3.56 million operators. That means, on average, one truck
operator owns 1.5 trucks. That is the reality of most China logistics firms. So how can
they compete with the giant international logistics companies?
5.2.1. State-Owned Players
After decades of development with the government support, the SOEs have an extensive
infrastructure and customer networks in China. These giant SOEs 'consider their huge
assets and wide networks as key advantages over new entrants46.' This is their biggest
asset not only against new entrants, but also against the existing competitors.
But the infrastructures are usually in very poor conditions. For example, Sinotrans, who
claims to have one of the best information systems in China, has a webpage that takes
minutes to get connected. If one clicks on a link to search something (news, etc), it takes
again minutes to return the page, usually an 'error' message. The conditions of
infrastructure are frustrating and the information systems are underdeveloped.
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The infrastructures, such as warehouses built decades ago, can only provide elementary
storage. It will cost a lot to upgrade these facilities to include the updated information/
intelligence systems, positioning systems, temperature/humidity control, and sorting/
automatic identification systems etc. The existing infrastructure can hardly meet the
higher requirements of integrated, efficient logistics services.
The SOEs won't have to worry too much about the network, and they have a traditional
customer base. But in order to meet the higher and higher logistics requirements, these
giant SOEs need to improve the quality of the assets and infrastructures, upgrade the
existing facilities or build new facilities. If these SOEs cannot provide up-to-date
facilities, they will lose their competitive advantage very quickly.
So reconstructing (updating, newly building) their asset-based infrastructure is their
priority. For example, Sinotrans' first strategy in logistics is 'Based on the traditional
advantages, to integrate the Group's resources and set up an integrated logistics
platform4 7 '. Sinotrans will use the $100 million from UPS to build a 51,800-square-meter
DC near the Beijing Capital International Airport. It also acquired a cold storage transport
company (with a large fleet of refrigerator trucks), and invested in three berths in
Lianyungang that have an annual throughput of 10.8 million tons. Sinotrans is also
negotiating owning its private fleet of aircrafts, in order to share China's sky (Sinotrans
does not have aircrafts right now). And 'China Rail United Logistics sees the logistics
platform it is building...as part of its strategic objective to become a prominent 3PL and
4PL in China'.
With the extensive infrastructures and a workforce that is of higher quality than the
private Chinese companies, these giant SOEs are able to offer integrated logistics
services to their customers. Particularly, they will be asset-based logistics providers.
5.2.2. Private Players
5.2.2.1. Expertise
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One of the most noteworthy developments in the China logistics industry is the
emergence of specialized logistics services, especially among the private logistics
companies.
Although there are fast growing private companies, compared to the ILCs or SOEs, they
are still operating at a very small scale. One tool for them to survive the fiercer
competition is not to compete against the giants (foreign or indigenous) in the fields of
network or infrastructure, but in specialized services.
For most emerging private logistics companies, 'small and refined' is a more realistic
strategy than 'big and complete' strategy. They do not need to do everything well to
survive; they only need to do one thing well to succeed. A nationwide network and
extensive infrastructure are a luxury that only a few leading companies can have.
Given the large market size that is still growing fast, and given the diverse logistics needs
over a vast country, this rationality helps the Chinese private logistics companies to
survive and grow. Currently, there are many specific logistics services. They are: port
logistics, automotive logistics, supermarket logistics, medical and pharmaceutical
logistics; steel logistics; tobacco logistics; postal logistics; foodstuff logistics;
refrigeration logistics; fresh and live logistics; petroleum and chemical logistics; home
appliance logistics; book and publication logistics; etc.
'The size and scope of China's market could allow these more specialized players to
develop into big business themselves4 9 .' Even if these players cannot evolve into
nationwide, integrated service providers, they can build themselves up as the largest or
the best players in their respective niche market.
This strategy complies with the marketing strategies. Because of limited resources, a
company needs to concentrate on core competitive advantages. Sometimes it has to give
up the markets in the other, non-competitive fields. By building a competitive advantage,
a company increases its bargaining power with the supplier and customer, raises the entry
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threat from potential players, differentiates itself from the substitutes, and augments its
market position with the existing competing players. This is a sustainable and realistic
approach.
5.2.2.2. Capital Requirements
The private companies do not lack the motivation to succeed, and they do not lack the
market to expand; but they do lack the capital to grow. China's four largest commercial
banks that dominate the financing market are owned by the government, and were
supposed to finance the SOEs (especially the large SOEs) in the planned economy.
Although this situation has changed, private companies have more difficulties than the
SOEs in borrowing from the banks. Whether these companies can get funded is critical to
their growth, and sometimes, to their survival.
Logistics companies are seeking more aggressive channels to fund their business. Going
public is very popular. For example, ZJS Express (which means Home Delivery in a
Hurry), China's largest private courier service company, seeks to get listed on the Hong
Kong exchange by the end of 2005. The founding president thinks his company has an
adequate network, information systems, talents and competitive prices, but lacks the
capital to support sustainable development.
It is scheduled that another private logistics company, Changan Minsheng Logistics
Company will officially get listed in Hong Kong Stock Exchange in May, 2005. The
initial public offering (IPO) is expected to raise $300 million. Another Shanghai-based
logistics company, Hao Hai International Holding, the only private logistics provider in
Shanghai that owns a bonded warehouse, plans to go public on the Stock Exchange of
Singapore, to raise about $18 million (or V150 million). This company may become
Shanghai's first logistics company to raise funds abroad.
Money is important, but is not the only motivation. As the indigenous private logistics
companies are still in their initial growth period, they also need to build a name. Even the
leading private logistics companies like DTW and PGL have plans to go public. They do
47
not necessarily lack the financial support from local governments and banks, but
governments and banks cannot help market their brand overseas. To go public at an
overseas stock exchange is a great chance to build a name outside China.
5.2.3. Merger & Acquisition
There are not too many M&A cases among the CLCs. For example, Sinotrans 'will
consider (M&A) if the target has reached a certain scale, has a high market share and a
network5 0 '. It is planning to acquire or has acquired a few small companies (like the
refrigeration trucking company) in China.
However, M&A and Strategic Alliances are traditionally not the mainstream strategies of
Chinese companies, and they are neither the emerging strategies. This has historical and
realistic roots.
Chinese culture values 'blood authentic', and Chinese companies always value the
trueborn branches. If the company set up branches one by one, these branches are
considered the company's own branches; otherwise there is always a hint that the
branches do not truly belong to this company. In China's 5,000 years of history, in order
to compete, businessmen have made every effort to destroy the competitors' business, but
few have simply bought the others' business either to eliminate the competitors in the
marketplace, or to expand their own business.
The lack of local M&A also has realistic considerations:5 1
First, CLCs are not strong enough. Except for a few exceptional top SOEs, all CLCs are
at their initial phase of growth. They are not strong enough to merge or acquire others.
Second, there prevalently exists local protectionism. If a logistics company based in
region A wants to merge another in region B, the government of B will become very alert:
will the transaction harm the local economy? Why shall this business be acquired by
'foreigners', not locals? This concern significantly lowers the chance of a successful deal.
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Third, there are governance problems. As the parent company may not consider the
acquired companies as its own, the employees of the acquired companies won't consider
themselves a part of the parent company, resulting in management difficulties. The parent
company's strategies and policies will not be executed as thoroughly as expected. If the
parent company removes the original managers (to ensure 'authentic blood' or policy
execution), the entire workforce may leave with the original management, leaving only
the skeleton company to the acquirer.
Because the market is growing so fast, one can set up its own branches and start business
easily. There is no need to initiate M&A. 'At the present, these companies are busy in
enlarging their own market and do not have extra hands or time to merge the others'. An
Amway executive so claimed in an interview.
5.2.4. Service Differentiation
First of all the key weaknesses of CLCs is a shortage of qualified people to handle daily
operations, which cause poor service level, result in tons of complaints and end with
customers going away.
The lack of well trained professionals and the recent introduction of logistics services
means CLCs are operating on very low levels, at a low price, and at the low value-adding
services. 'Their ability to offer value added services in a cost-effective and efficient way
on their own is very limited 2 .'
Lack of well educated and well trained professionals is the cause of low levels. In the
competition for talent, the CLCs are in an inferior position. The people in these two
industries are, on average, ill-educated and trained. As a capital, technology and
knowledge intensive service, high quality logistics service requires well trained
professionals. Local companies, logistics companies or not, are not able to afford the
salaries that ILCs are offering now. The salary gap between local companies and foreign
companies can be 2-10 times. The service level is low.
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The CLCs lack the experience in integrated, complex logistics services and supply chain
management. The China logistics industry is rooted in warehousing and transportation.
The concept of 'logistics' was first introduced in the middle of 1990's 53, and the concept
of 'supply chain' in this century. As new players in the marketplace, their skills and
services are rudimentary compared to those of ILCs. They are only starting to learn
supply chain management and value-adding services are rare.
In the interviews with three executives from ILCs and one executive from Amway China
Ltd (as a logistics user and independent observer), all used 3 'L's to describe China's
indigenous logistics standard: Low Skills, Low Levels and Low Prices. It's safe to draw
such a conclusion regarding the CLC's performance.
Because of this dilemma, CLCs have to compete mainly in an arena other than that of the
ILCs - the domestic logistics customers with low returns and less complex requirements.
For example, financing warehousing is a service in which ILCs are not very interested in,
but in which the CLCs have advantages. By leveraging these kinds of strategies, the
CLCs can avoid a face-to-face competition with the ILCs and still retain market share.
Detailed description of the financing warehousing is provided in Appendix A.
5.2.5. Cooperation
Because of the low skills, learning through practice and cooperation is a priority for
CLCs. By providing service to MNCs, CLCs began to learn modern logistics theory and
practice in daily operations, to finally grow up and to expand their market with
continually high standard requirements from MNCs. PGL's successful story is one of the
good examples of this kind.
While PGL just started its logistics services, P&G was looking for a partner to outsource
the logistics business. By the year of 1996, PGL became P&G's general agent for the rail
freight. Under P&G's hands-on training, PGL's workers learned how to manage a
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warehouse, how to report the inventory level, and even how to maintain the warehouse in
a clean condition. By providing these low-end services to an MNC and meeting higher
and more complex requirements, PGL evolved into a modem 3PL provider. ZJS Express
also showed interest in cooperating with ILCs. For example, it has been contacting the
French Post and all the four giants (DHL, FedEx, UPS, TNG) for further cooperation or
partnerships.
Cooperation is not only a means to learning and growth, but also a tool to revolutionize
the minds and business logics. For example, Hao Hai International Holding, the
Shanghai-based logistics company that wishes to go public in Singapore, wants to
introduce an international logistics company as its strategic investor. This investor will be
a 'top player, who will not only expand Hao Hai's international business, but also bring
advanced management techniques and values to the company,' the president said in a
public interview.
Cooperation is also a means to secure business. China Shipping has formed a strategic
alliance with its logistics user BaoSteel - a customer-service provider alliance. COSCO
and Changhong Electronics, China's leading electronic manufacturer, have a partnership
since 2004 too. But all these companies are giant SOEs, and traditionally these
companies have strong ties. However, the strategic alliance is not a new approach to
attack the market.
As CLCs are establishing themselves as specialized players in niche markets, they
become part of longer supply chains 54 . They are either the core player of the long supply
chain, or participate in the chain initiated or dominated by other players. This kind of
cooperation can establish a win-win-win situation between the downstream and upstream
logistics players, and the customers.
For those giants, cooperation is still a must. 'Asset-heavy incumbent companies are now
actively looking for technical and operational knowhow, opening up opportunities for
foreign companies to work with them.' That UPS bought out the customers from
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Sinotrans does not mean to cease cooperation. Sinotrans will serve as UPS' agent in
regions that account for 15% of China's GDP and that the current UPS network is not
able to cover. In a news article, a Sinotrans executive declared that the company is
planning to operate its own fleet of aircraft, 'after all, UPS will still need a fleet to help
them deliver services in China'. That is to say, even giant SOEs want to play a role in the
global supply chain. The giant SOEs are 'receptive to partherships and other cooperative
arrangements with leading foreign third-party logistics companies who have real
technical, operational, and solutions know-how'5 5 .
At the 2004 Boao Asia Forum 2004 Shenzhen International Logistics Conference held in
the middle of December 2004, many logistics executives thought that in order for CLCs
to enter the foreign markets, these companies should seize the time when the ILCs enter
the China market, seek the proper partners, learn from them and establish a long-term,
broad network for their future development. Similar to ILCs, China logistics companies
also need some channels to help them open and enter the foreign markets56 .
5.2.6. Overseas Expansion
There is no clear indication that CLCs are aggressively expanding their international
presence at this moment. They are keeping their eyes on their home base. The Chinese
logistics market is huge, and it has provided enough space for CLCs to develop.
Furthermore, the majority of CLCs are still not strong enough to expand their business
abroad.
It's wise and realistic not to adventure outside the rich and big home that is not yet fully
exploited. Although the giant logistics companies have overseas offices established in the
1980's and 1990's as their overseas branches to support their international transportation,
their businesses are heavily dependent on agents. For example, Sinotrans has business in
200 countries, but there are only 40 overseas offices. The most international business is
done via the agents. As Contrill claimed, 'don't expect a wave of Chinese 3PLs to land
on Western shores soon. The pace of change in China is slow by Western standards and
there is much to do in the home market57,
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5.2.7. Conclusion
China logistics market is growing fast, providing chances to all kinds of players at
various service levels and standards. The CLCs are operating at the low-end of the
market, with low returns. For this reason, cooperation with MNCs or ILCs are very
attractive to CLCs to learn and improve their logistics techniques.
M&A is typically not adopted for market growth, and CLCs are not strong enough to
expand abroad. The home market is big enough for them to increase their market share
and grow up. For those giant CLCs, network and infrastructure are their assets that can
help provide leverage in the marketplace, and for those small and regional players, the
expertise in a special area can help them survive and grow.
5.3. Role of the China Government
The Chinese government aptly realized the underdevelopment of its logistics industry.
China's overall logistics costs are over two times of those in the US. In 2003, the logistics
costs accounted for the 8.5% of US GDP, and in China it was 21.4%. In 2003 and 2004,
the overheated economy consumed more food, oil, coal and electricity than the
distribution systems could offer at their maximum capacity, and resulted in the
nationwide attention to the logistics issues. This event prompted a wave of new laws and
regulations to promote the development of the logistics industry and practice. In general,
the Chinese governments are taking two steps: infrastructure building and policy making.
5.3.1. Policy Direction
The policies are meant to direct the development of the logistics industry and practices.
As the US government uses the interest rate to influence the economy growth direction,
the China government uses laws and regulations to deter, promote or guide the economy.
On January 1, 2004, China's first Act of Port took effective. It grants the same treatment
to all kinds of investors and operators of ports in China, whether state-owned, private and
foreign. This act in fact grants the foreign investors the national treatment.
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In August 2004, nine ministry-level government arms58 jointly released a regulation, The
Notice on the Promotion of China's Modem Logistics Industry. This notice has two
historical breakthroughs:
1. It officially and for the first time treats the logistics industry as an industry: In the
past, only transportation and storage were considered an industry in this field, and
logistics has a very vague concept in terms of the legal status;
2. It coordinates the conflicts among originally separate supervisory government
institutions, facilitating the development of the industry: In the past, a business
involving different government institutes had to have the approval of respective
government arms. For example, a foreign freight forwarder had to get approvals
from at least three ministry-level authorities: the Ministry of Communications for
a license in freight forward, Ministry of Commerce (formerly Ministry of Foreign
Trade and Economic Cooperation, namely MOFTEC) for a license of foreign
investment, and the Administration of Industry for the corporation registration,
and these government bodies might have had conflicting opinions regarding
issuing a license to such an investor. Now these ministries will coordinate to
provide one voice.
This notice has four parts that aim to:
1. Create an administrative environment that promotes the development of the
industry, including: eliminating redundant regulations on the incorporation of
logistics firms; and unifying the items of taxations on logistics companies and
reducing the tax rates.
2. Create an economic environment that favors the development of the industry,
including: encouraging enterprises to separate their non-core logistics business
from their core business and outsource to third parties and professional logistics
providers; easing the financing and loan process to logistics companies;
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simplifying import and export procedures; encouraging foreign investment in the
industry; and establishing more distribution center parks to provide high efficient
logistics services.
3. Promote the logistics standards, and train more logistics professionals.
4. Supervise and administer the industry development. The notice aims to establish a
cross-ministry mechanism to coordinate the regulations and policies, plan the
blueprint of the industry, solve the problems, and push the development of the
industry.
If this notice is a guideline for China's logistics industry development and has indirect
impact on the industry, then another regulation has a direct impact on the daily logistics
operations: the Notice on Reducing the Rates of Vehicle Tolls, jointly issued by the State
Development and Reform Commission and the Ministry of Communications and
effective on January 1, 2005. This notice reduces the tolls rates for trucks and trailers
above 10 tons by 20% to 30%. The implication of this notice is very clear: the
government wants to encourage professional and special large-sized trucks to replace the
dominant light trucks, and promote the development of professional trucking companies.
On February 16, 2005, the Ministry of Commerce and the General Administration of
Industry and Commerce jointly released the Advice on the Relevant Problems of
Registration and Administration of International Freight Forwarding Enterprises. This
advice expressly changes China's approval system to a registration system, which means,
companies of international freight forwarding no longer need approval from the
governing authorities to do business; they only need to register with the governing
authority to start their business.
5.3.3. Industry Standard, Society and Training
Realizing the extreme shortage of logistics professionals, the China government started to
launch various logistics programs. Approved by the China central Government (the State
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Council), the China Federation of Logistics and Procurement (CFLP, or the Federation)
was founded in 2004. It is China's CLM (now CSCMP), and is a semi-government, semi-
private organization. It is China's first national, cross-industrial professional society in
the areas of logistics, procurement and supply chain management. The Federation aims at
setting the industry standard, promoting logistics awareness and practice, and conducting
logistics certification authentication.
Right now, 97 educational institutions have logistics programs, enrolling over 6000
students, ranging from certificate, diploma to graduate education. The Federation has
started training the logistician, advanced logistician and assistant logistician qualification
certification. Over the past three years, about 10,000 people have received some kind of
short training. Although these numbers are far from sufficient to feed the market, the
education and training sectors are trying to catch up with the development of the industry.
5.3.4. Conclusions
The China government understands the importance of the logistics industry to the
country's sustainable development. The infrastructure building, policy making and
logistics professional education all aid the quick and healthy development of the logistics
industry.
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Chapter 6. Future Perspective & Conclusions
This chapter projects the possible future dynamics of the industry, the potential problems
and risks in the China logistics industry, and the research fields that need further studies.
6.1. Future Projection
This section aims at the future evolution and risks of the China logistics industry.
6.1.1. SW Analysis
SW (Strength and Weakness) analysis is an effective tool to help us understand the
competitive advantages of all the players. The following table is a summary of the
strengths and weaknesses of the three different players in the China logistics industry,
based on the analysis in previous chapters or the author's personal experience in the
China logistics industry for over 10 years.
Table 6 SW Analysis of Different Players
Factors SOE Players Private Players ILCs
Customers
SOEs + 0 -
Non-SOE Local Customers 0 + -
MNCs 0 0 +
Infrastructure/Network
Nationwide Network + 0 0
International Network - - +
Services
Integrated Logistics Services 0 -_+
Expertise (Specialized Services) 0 + 0
Service Level - - +
Management
Management Skills 0 0 +
Motivations 0 + +
Flexibility -_+ +
Low Labor Cost + +
Talent Sufficiency -
Capital Availability + - +
Culture
Cultural Adaption + +
Localization + + -
Guznxi (relationship) + + 0
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Remark: '+' denotes that a player is strong in this specific field, '-' denotes that the
player is weak in the field, and '0' denotes that the player is marginally good in the field.
6.1.2. Near Future Projection
The above table clearly indicates that the different players have different interests,
strengths and weaknesses in the market. We are able to forecast a few rough scenarios for
the near future (about 3 years from now) of the China's logistics industry:
1. The three types of players will have their own respective market in the near future.
The division of their respective customer bases tells us that the different players
are able to co-exist for a few years. Although there is some overlapping in the
customer bases, basically, their customers are generally well divided between the
three types of the logistics companies. There won't be very fierce competition for
the customers, and each player can have its own market.
2. The division of their respective positioning also helps the different players stay in
the market in the near future.
Generally speaking, the SOEs are asset-and-network-based companies. They own
large network and heavy assets. The private players are specialists in niche
markets, and the ILCs are advanced, integrated service providers. The three types
of players won't compete fiercely in the marketplace.
3. Cooperation, or strategic alliance, will still be a very popular theme among the
different players.
Because the players have strengths and weaknesses in different fields, cooperation
or strategic alliance can help the players compensate for their weak areas and
make full use of their strength. 'Local companies with strong asset positions but
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low skills ... would make a good match for sophisticated international players
with global networks, ample investment funds and high China aspirations59 .'
There is a need, especially on the Chinese companies' side, for cooperation.
Compared to the international giants, all CLCs are medium or small size
enterprises. It will be hard to protect their originally small market with marketing
levers. Cooperation can help the companies to survive, learn and grow. The
question is, how much is the price?
The ideal solution is to become an indispensable part of the ILCs' supply chain
with the CLCs' asset - either the infrastructure or the expertise in an area. For
example, it is impossible that the ILCs are versatile enough to offer all logistics
services at an expert level. From time to time, it'll be necessary for them to
outsource part of their logistics services to private players, who are a specialist in
that field. By forming strategic alliances, the ILCs are able to offer their
customers an integrated, one-stop service, while the private players can participate
in the supply chain as one of the important players.
In short, as the market is growing fast, in a short period, the players will be focusing on
enlarging their share in their respective market. Before each player can stand firm on
their own ground and strong enough to take more revolutionary steps, there won't be very
dramatic changes.
6.1.3. Mid-Future Scenario
In the mid future, however, there may be a round of industry reshuffling. This is because
China's indigenous companies are vulnerable, and the ILCs' network expansion will be
complete in a few years time.
6.1.3.1. Vulnerabilities of CLCs
First, China's indigenous logistics companies are young and weak. Although they are
growing at an annual growth rate of 20-30%, their foundation is not firm. For example,
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China's 26 listed logistics companies (mostly state-owned companies) totally raised Y5.5
billion 0 , equivalent to $665 million. This means, the average fund that these companies
raised from the capital market is less than $26 million. As only the best (and, usually the
largest) players are able to get listed in China's stock market, one can imagine what size
of China's leading logistics companies is. Once the international capital attacks these
companies, they will be easily overwhelmed by the flood of foreign capital.
Second, they lack long-term and sustainable strategy. In the Ultra Mach-TNT transaction,
the management of Ultra Mach 'did not even hesitate a second to hand the company to
il 61TNT', and the senior managers received considerable rewards . In another case,
observers criticized Sinotrans' selling of their customers for $100 million to UPS as a
short-sight action and a 'suicide'. The transaction is regarded as sacrificing the long-term
interest for the short-term financial statement, and the stock price of Sinotrans dropped
the day after the transaction was declared.
A sarcastic opinion is from a DHL executive, who is a Chinese and who has been in the
industry for about 20 years. He said that those CLCs who are striving to become the
largest or best players in the niche market, or to get listed at overseas stock market, are
doing so to make them more attractive to be acquired. In his opinion, the purpose of
leading the niche market or going public is only meant to increase their bargaining power,
and sell themselves at a better price when an acquisition offer is before them. Although
this opinion is arbitrary without strong supportive evidence, this opinion appear logical.
6.1.3.2. ILCs' Long-Term Strategy
The ILCs are quickly establishing their presence and network in China. As described in
Chapter 5, the current strategy of the ILCs is not to crush the local companies or compete
for more business, but to set up the nationwide infrastructure network. It may take 2-3
years to complete and integrate the initial network engineering, as shown by UPS' buyout,
FedEx' strategic alliance with Kodak, or TNT's franchising.
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So what will happen after they build the infrastructure network, understand the culture,
localized their business and exhaust the Fortune Global 500? Will the giants be satisfied
with the present hundred million dollars of revenue in China, compared to their tens of
billions revenue worldwide? In the past seven years, Deutsche Post World Net has spent
about $11 billion to acquire and grow from 1997 revenue of Eurol4.1 billion to 2004
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revenue of Euro43 billion . For international giant logistics companies like DPWN and
UPS, money is not a problem when buying into a market. One billion dollars can buy all
of China's listed logistics companies right now. China's hosting of the 2008 Olympic
Games will provide a world stage for the logistics companies to play and compete, thus
making the China logistics pie looks more appealing. If the ILCs want to benefit more
from the games and play a bigger role, nothing can prevent them, except for political
intervention.
6.1.3.3. Conclusion
So it remains a question as to how the industry dynamics will be like in the mid future. It
is up to the ILCs - how they will play then. It's very possible that the industry will
reshuffle, as the ILCs will have the time, infrastructure and network to do more
aggressive investments.
6.1.4. Risks Analysis
For the international logistics companies, China is a lucrative market. Capital will flood
into the hot land. However, risks exist that the ILCs must be aware of.
6.1.4.1. Legal, Political & Military
China's bureaucratic governments regulate the various aspects of business. The policies
governing a business can be issued by various government departments, and sometimes
the policies conflict with one another, leaving the investors at loose ends.
A thorough understanding of how the bureaucratic government runs is important. In order
for a foreign business to succeed, the investors need to be familiar with the latest policies.
Market competition in China does not always rely on advanced techniques, but on how
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quickly one can react to the new policies. In China's modem history, there are precedents
that one regulation is passed and then another law is released to revoke the previous
regulation. Or sometimes, conflicting laws exist at the same time, or there are no laws at
all governing a certain activity or business. It requires high political skills to tackle these
issues.
Since the release of the Notice on the Promotion of China's Modem Logistics Industry in
August 2004, the China government has been trying to consolidate the government
resources to set up a one-voice mechanism regarding the logistics business and
investment. While the efforts are admirable, the results are still worth observing. Just as
an article title says, 'China: Reforms May Take Awhile 6 3 ', government and policy
changes always are slow, although China is on a no-return road in opening up the
logistics industry.
In addition to the policy-related issues, there is a Taiwan problem that may involve
military actions. Since the Nationalist government was swept out of the mainland China
in 1949, Taiwan has been ruled separately from the communist system. The separation
tendency increased since the mid- 1990's, and the inauguration of the pro-separation Chen
Shui-bian intensified the cross-strait relation. In response to the increasing separation
tendency, China's top legislative body, the National People's Congress, passed a law on
March 13, 2005, authorizing the State Council (the Central Government) and the Central
Military Commission to use force if the island moves toward formal independence. To
make things more complex, 'U.S. President George W. Bush has pledged to help Taiwan
defend itself against any Chinese attack 64'. This pledge exposes the US firms to more
political risks.
6.1.4.2. Social & Economic
China is in transition to an open market economy, and unrest prevails in China. In the
past decade, the gap between the rich, coastal regions and the poor, inland regions has
been increasing; the gap between the cities and the rural regions has been increasing; the
gap between the richest and the poorest (in cities or in rural regions) has been increasing.
62
Laid-off workers appeal to street demonstrations from time to time, here and there,
although seldom are these events publicly reported by the government-controlled media.
The nation is severely divided in terms of their wealth, education and future. If the
situation does not change, it could lead to more severe social instability.
There have been concerns with China's economic overheating and potential hard landing.
These are potential risks. In the 1993-1994, China did experience a hard landing.
6.1.4.3. Exchange Rate
In the past 2 or 3 years, there has been pressure from especially Japan and the USA for
China to loosen its exchange rate controls. The relaxation is supposed to appreciate the
Chinese Yuan (or Remminbi, RMB for short) and depreciate the US dollar.
If the China government finally appreciates the value of RMB, it means that the value of
the existing investments in China will appreciate, but the future investments require more
funds in terms of US dollars, and future income, will appreciate in terms of US dollars.
The appreciation of Chinese currency will basically favor the international investors, but
still investors will need to pay attention to China's foreign currency policy, and evaluate
the potential impact on their operations.
6.1.4.4. Act of God & Force Majeure
Given the large territory of China and complex natural conditions, international logistics
companies need to take into consideration natural risks. For example, if one investor has
extensive infrastructure in China, earthquake, flood, and typhoon, etc are the factors that
he may wish to consider. In 1976, an earthquake devastated the entire city of Tangshan,
some 120 miles away from Beijing, killing over 160,000 people. Tangshan is now one of
the industrial cities in the Bohai Bay Triangle economic region. Frequent flooding occurs
along the Yangtze River, China's economic artery, once every 4 or 5 years. Physical
infrastructures are subject to the mercy of these natural disasters.
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In 2003, SARS burst in to a worldwide focus, which almost shut China entirely off from
the rest of the world, and the US West Coast port shutdown in 2002 blocked the supply
chains both from Asia to the US and from the US to Asia.
6.3. Conclusion
Right now, the international logistics companies are busy expanding their infrastructure
network to reach more regions and customers in China. As China lifts restrictions on the
logistics industry, independent operation is a theme among the ILCs. The Chinese state-
owned companies are strengthening their infrastructure lead and transferring to asset-
based logistics providers, and the private players are building their brand name and
expertise in the market place.
The three types of players have different focuses, market positions and customer targets.
Because the market is growing very fast, they are able to co-exist peacefully in their
respective field in the near future, until about 2008. Cooperation among different players
(especially between ILCs and SOEs, and ILCs and private players) will prevail.
However, in the mid future (after 2008), the industry may reshuffle. By that time, the
ILCs will have finished their network and infrastructure building in China. With the
support of their own infrastructure and network, the ILCs will be able to localize their
services. At that time, the competitive advantages that the CLCs are enjoying now will
decrease, and the direct competition is expected. Because CLCs, compared with the ILCs,
are not strong enough, it will be a tough time for the Chinese indigenous logistics
companies.
6.4. Future Research
There are two major categories of logistics providers: air and courier service based
companies with UPS, FedEx, TNT as representatives, and ocean transportation based
logistics providers with APL Logistics and Maersk Logistics as representatives. This
paper mainly studied the first category - and their strategies in China.
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Admittedly, this approach simplifies the situation. Although the first category of logistics
companies can reflect a portion of the overall strategies of both categories, it's not
complete. Further research on the strategies of the second category of players can help
generate a holistic view of the dynamics of the China logistics industry.
Another field that needs continuous attention is the strategies of Chinese logistics
companies. Unlike the ILCs, the CLCs usually don't have a regular and healthy news
release system. They are very conservative towards the media, reluctant to speak to them.
This culture greatly limits the effectiveness of the research. As China changes quickly,
the management skills, logistics techniques, global and strategic views, and international
positions of Chinese firms will change too. How will CLCs play in the long term - if they
grow strong enough - will be of interest to the business world, not just the logistics
industry.
A third field is the dynamics of the China logistics industry after 2008. As the author
projected, 2008 will see the 2008 Olympics Games in China, and the China logistics
industry will be more open than it is now. Because the ILCs will have set up their own
network and infrastructure in China, and the CLCs will have completed their infancy
period, direct competition may occur. But what the dynamics of the industry will be like
still remains unanswered. If one can project the market structure of the mid-future China
logistics industry, we will able to forecast the future vision too.
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Appendix A: Financing Warehousing
-- A Value-Adding 3PL Service, A Differentiation Arena
Chinese 3PL providers are introducing a new value-adding service, financing
warehousing, to their customers. It is a combination of traditional warehousing and
financing. The 3PL customers can use their own inventories/commodities to secure loans
from banks, the banks can expand their business, and the 3PL providers can make profit
from this value-adding service. The financing warehouse creates a win-win-win situation,
and helps the 3PL providers in the face of foreign competition.
This appendix outlines how the model works, its impact on the relevant parties, how
Chinese logistics providers use it as a tool to compete with international logistics
providers, and what the current market is like.
The Business Model
When a customer sends and the 3PL provider receives raw materials or finished products
for storage, the 3PL provider issues a warehouse receipt. This receipt is both a proof of
ownership and a transferable security that the customer can endorse and transfer. In
financing warehouse, the customer hypothecates ('mortgage' current assets with
ownership transferred) this receipt to secure a loan from banks. The simplified model is
as follows:
4. Bank Offers Hypothecation Loan to Customer
3PL .4 Bank
Customer
3. Customer Endorses Receipt for Loan
1. Commodity
Shipped to Warehouse 2. Warehouse Issues
for Storage/Custody , Warehouse Receipt
3PL
Warehouse
Figure 3 Financing Warehousing Model
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So how will the customer pay the loan? When the customer receives proceeds from
processing the materials or sale of the commodities, the fund will be remitted to a special
account with the bank, just as the hypothecation agreement requires. The bank will
deduct a certain amount from the incoming fund as the customer's payback of the loan.
The bank then transfers the balance of the fund to the customer's regular account, under
the disposal of the customer. Thus, the bank safeguards its loan, and the customer is able
to use the loan to get the business to continue.
In reality, this business is more complex than the above diagram shows. For example, the
order of these steps may be reverse. Sometimes the step 4 becomes the first step; step 1
becomes step 2, and so on. In this case, the bank first lends money to the customer, and
then the customer instructs its supplier to ship/deliver the materials/commodities to the
warehouse assigned by the bank, making the materials under the monitor and control of
the bank.
When necessary, the hypothecation loan can be 'revolving'. This greatly facilitates the
customer's procurement, production and distribution, and saves a lot of repetitive, case-
by-case negotiation time.
In this business, theoretically there exist at least three contracts, or three different legal
relations:
3PL
Customer 11* Bank
3PL
Warehouse
Figure 4 Contractual Relationships in Financing Warehousing
68
1. Between the 3PL Customer and Bank, there is a loan/hypothecation agreement;
2. Between the 3PL Warehouse and the 3PL Customer, there is a storage agreement, by
which the customer consigns the materials to the warehouse, who stores and ships the
commodities in a safe condition as the customer's agent;
3. Between the 3PL Warehouse and Bank, there is a custody agreement, by which the
bank entrusts the warehouse to keep the targeted materials under the warehouse's
custody, and the warehouse monitors and controls the types and quantity of the
materials as the bank's agent.
But in the real world, the contracts 2 and 3 are usually combined into one, where all three
parties are involved to store, manage, monitor and control the inventory.
Under this business model, the regular business procedure of the customer is not affected.
The bank allows the customer to process or sell the hypothecated materials under normal
business procedures. But the bank requires the logistics provider to monitor and track the
materials, and control the delivery and shipping of these inventories. If the customer is
able to pay back the hypothecation loan as per the agreement after processing or selling
these materials, the bank will not intervene in the customer's regular business operations.
Embedded Risks
The 3PL providers shall be aware of the risks they are exposed to:
1, Fluctuation of the value of the materials. If the value depreciates significantly, the 3PL
provider is exposed to market risks once the 3PL's customer is not able to enforce the
loan/hypothecation agreement and the storage agreement;
2, Legal issues. If the materials under a 3PL provider's custody/storage are found illegal
(for example, smuggled commodities), then the 3PL provider is exposed to legal and
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economic risks. It will be a problem whether the 3PL provider can recover the storage
and management costs;
3, Fire, theft, etc. The 3PL provider will have to be responsible for the safety of the
materials, and compensate either the customer or the bank.
Generally speaking, the 3PL providers are exposed to all these risks, whether or not they
provide financing warehousing. But under the financing warehouse business, these risks
become significant because the 3PL providers' own interest is more dependent on the
service they provide and the value of the materials that they store.
The Significances of Financing Warehouse
The financing warehouse is very helpful in China, where the credit system is not well
developed, and 80% of small and medium enterprises (SMEs) have difficulties in
securing loans from financial institutes. A recent paper disclosed that in 2004, China's
largest bank, the Commercial and Industrial Bank of China (CIBC) lent to only 2% of
China's SMEs. And CIBC is the most aggressive bank in loaning to SMEs in China 65. To
the 3PL providers, this service can help them expand their business scope and add value
to their traditional service.
After SMEs purchase raw materials or manufacture finished products before they can
finally sell them, they may encounter a shortage in current capital. The financing
warehouse helps SMEs to activate the values of these inventories before the values are
eventually realized. The inventory therefore won't harm a company's current capital; it
instead lubricates the whole supply chain, from procurement, manufacturing to sales, and
from financing support to logistics service. The business helps a company establish its
credit record, and the integration of logistics and financing in one package greatly
increases the customer's business efficiency.
To the banks, a reliable 3PL provider serves as a warrantor to reduce their loan risks, and
the bank can improve the loan efficiency too. The financing warehouse increases their
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willingness to offer bank facilities to initially not favorite SMEs, and helps banks expand
their business scope.
On the other hand, financing warehousing adds value to 3PL providers' service. They
evaluate the materials, monitor these commodities, assure customer credit to the bank,
and when necessary, sell or auction the forfeited inventories. Their security is guaranteed,
just like the banks, against the inventories.
When financing is a big issue to SMEs, the logistics providers can use financing
warehousing to attract more customers and strengthen the relationship with them. SMEs,
on average, lack the ability to handle logistics affairs effectively and efficiently for three
reasons. First, logistics service requires intensive capital. Not all SMEs can afford
managing the logistics by themselves. Second, logistics is a knowledge intensive business.
Not all SMEs are capable of handling the logistics issues themselves. Third, logistics
requires economy of scale. Not all SMEs have the scale by themselves. Therefore,
outsourcing is their best solution, and if logistics outsourcing can come along with
financing, the ties between SMEs and logistics providers are tightened.
In the competitive logistics market, any profit-generating service may determine whether
a company can remain in business. In China, SMEs account for 99% of all kinds of
businesses, or, there are about 10 million SMEs in China. They generate 60% of China's
GDP, or, equivalent to $800 billion. On average, China's logistics costs account for 21%
of the GDP. In July 2004, China's inventory level is $115 billion66 . If the inventory level
of SMEs is only half that of national average, it is still a $35-billion market ($115 billion
x 60% x 50%). Those who win SMEs can sustain the competition, or stand out. This is a
significant competitive advantage of Chinese companies over international logistics
companies.
An Effective Competitive Tool
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The financing warehouse is important to Chinese domestic logistics providers. For
several reasons, they can use this business to leverage their competition against
international logistics providers.
First, this business is very 'grass rooted'. The target of this business is local small and
medium enterprises, which lack the necessary, able people to communicate with
international logistics providers. Chinese domestic logistics providers are able to use their
linguistic/dialectic advantages, and benefit from their close relationship very quickly and
effectively. The relationship built between customers and domestic logistics providers
only gets stronger and stronger as both parties have interests tied in transactions.
International logistics providers, given the cultural and linguistic limitations, will find it
hard to have a big share in this market.
Second, in terms of location, Chinese domestic logistics providers have easy access to the
SMEs and find it much easier to provide the financing warehousing service. The demand
exists not only in big cities where international logistics company are present, but also
more in small cities and rural regions. International logistics providers, given their limited
orbit in the vast China market, will find it difficult to reach out to the local, regional
financing warehouse market. Their business arms may simply be not long enough.
According to Transport Intelligence Ltd's China Logistics Report 2004, '(the logistics
outsourcing's) appeal to the rapidly expanding smaller and medium sized shippers mostly
relies more on the logistics companies' ability to offer regional and national distribution
network' (Report, page 100). It may take years for the foreign logistics company to set up
their network to start this business at a considerable scale.
Third, financing warehousing requires close collaboration among three parties - logistics
providers, customers and banks. Only those very familiar with local customs, practices
and business cultures can handle this business. Local protectionism may also prevent
international players from taking an active role.
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Finally, it is hard for international players to really get deeply involved in such a labor-
intensive business. The logistics providers will have to negotiate and coordinate with
customers and banks, and monitor and track the materials/commodities, etc. Here, high
technology application or advanced management techniques are inferior to the closeness
of the 3PL companies' relationship with the customers and banks, and the resources
invested in the service. Whether international players will be satisfied with the reward
(input-output ratio) is dubious.
Conclusion
The financing warehouse was elected as No. I among the Ten Logistics Innovations of
Year 2004, and Chinese logistics companies have brought this business to a significant
level.
So far, hardly any international players have started this business. However, China's
domestic logistics providers are enthusiastic about this 'innovative' service. For example,
China Materials Storage & Transport Co (CMST), one of China's largest logistics
providers that have a national network (including warehouses), has doubled its financing
warehousing business from 2002 to 2003. The bank facility limit offered to CMST
reached Chinese RMB2-billion (or, $241 million). Assuming the turns of the bank facility
are 4 (CMST's inventory turns are 8, according to its average inventory of 3 million tons
and throughput volume of 25 million tons), then CMST's revenue is $964 millions a year,
close to $1-billion. Another regional logistics company in Southern China also recorded
$500 million of revenue for this service in 2003.
This business model applies to many different categories of products/materials.
According to China Materials Storage & Transportation Co., the materials/products they
can hypothecate range to almost everything from ferrous metals, non-ferrous metals,
construction materials to food, paper or coal, from home appliances to automobiles or
chemical products, from raw materials to semi-products or finished goods. There is not a
very clear indication of what industry or what kind of materials/products most fit into this
service and what do not. The application's prospects are promising.
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All the risks require the 3PL provider to improve their management, and the value that
the financing warehousing provides strengthen the 3PL providers' market position. While
many domestic logistics providers can do this business easily, it's hard for international
players. This is an invisible barrier that helps to maintain Chinese companies' advantages,
and avoid direct competition with foreign companies. It's a useful strategy when one
group is not a competitor of another.
The belief is popular that this innovative service will proliferate among Chinese logistics
companies very quickly, and it has great promise under China's current business
environment. It will become a forceful tool for local logistics companies to survive, grow
and compete with the foreign logistics companies.
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Glossary
CLC
DHL/DPWN
Euro
FedEx
ILC
IPO
JV
JVC
M&A
MNC
RMB
SOE
TEU
TNT/TPG
UPS
VMI
WOFE
Chinese Logistics Company
Deutsche Post World Net
European Dollar (Eurol = $1.3; $1 = $0.77)
Federal Express
International Logistics Company
Initial Public Offering
Joint Venture
Joint Venture Company
Merger & Acquisition
Multinational Corporation
Renminbi (Chinese Yuan. Currency Sign: V. $1 = V8.275; V1 = $0.121)
State-Owned Enterprise
Twenty-foot Equivalent Unit
TNT Postal Group
United Parcel Services
Vendor Managed Inventory
Wholly-Owned Foreign Enterprise
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